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We document a negative and convex relationship between hedge fund size and future risk-
adjusted returns. Small hedge funds outperform large hedge funds by 2.75 percent per year after 
adjusting for risk. This over performance cannot be explained by fund age, leverage, serial 
correlation, backfill bias, or incubation bias. The capacity constraints are not confined to the 
smallest funds, and manifest across various investment styles and regions. In particular, they are 
strongest for funds managed by multiple principals that trade small, illiquid securities, suggesting 
that the observed diseconomies can be traced to price impact and hierarchy costs (Stein, 2002). 
Interestingly, these capacity constraints facing individual hedge funds do not extend to funds of 
hedge funds.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 How significant and pervasive are the capacity constraints facing individual hedge funds? 
Do small hedge funds deliver economically larger risk-adjusted returns than do large hedge 
funds? Which hedge funds are most affected by capacity constraints and why? The answers to 
these questions are immensely relevant to investors and have important implications for 
performance persistence and the existence of incentive fees.  
 Recent studies have shed light on capacity constraints in the mutual fund industry (Chen, 
et al. 2004; Yan, 2008). However, unlike mutual funds, hedge funds typically trade complex and 
illiquid securities, including derivatives and over-the-counter securities. They exploit limited 
arbitrage opportunities through dynamic strategies that involve speed, leverage, and attention to 
execution costs. It seems that the impact of fund size, if any, should be amplified for hedge 
funds. Indeed, the widespread use of incentive fees by hedge fund management companies 
suggests that hedge fund investment opportunities are not as scalable as those for mutual funds 
(Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross, 2003). As a result of possible diseconomies of scale, several 
successful hedge funds have stopped accepting new money, trading asset growth for future 
returns. Some hedge funds that have ignored such scalability issues have perished (Lowenstein, 
2001). Clearly, the hedge fund industry provides an interesting laboratory for studying the effects 
of diseconomies of scale on fund management.   
 Yet, the evidence in favor of capacity constraints in the hedge fund industry appears 
mixed. Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) find that successful funds are less likely to accept 
new money while Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008) show that inflows hurt the ability of 
Funds of Funds to deliver alpha. Naik, Ramadorai, and Stromqvist (2007) document investment 
strategy level capacity constraints. However, none of these studies focus on the fundamental 
relationship between fund assets under management and future fund performance. An exception 
is Getmansky (2005) who finds a positive and concave relationship between fund size and future 
performance; hedge funds initially benefit from an increase in fund size, but investment 
performance suffers once funds grow beyond a certain optimal level. Yet, given the logic of Berk 
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and Green (2004), Getmansky’s results1 seem inconsistent with the dearth of performance 
persistence in the hedge fund industry (Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, 1999; Liang, 2000; 
Agarwal and Naik, 2000). Hence, we believe that the topic of capacity constraints in the hedge 
fund industry deserves a fresh look. 
 In this effort, we investigate the effects of fund size on the cross-section of future fund 
performance. We find using a Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression framework that the 
relationship between past fund size and fund performance is downward sloping and convex. 
Specifically, we estimate cross-sectional regressions on monthly fund abnormal returns with last 
month’s fund size and square of fund size as independent variables. The regressions control for a 
kitchen sink of fund characteristics that may affect fund performance and allow for style and 
investment region fixed effects. We adjust for hedge fund risk exposure using the Fung and 
Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model which has been shown to have considerable explanatory power 
over aggregate hedge fund returns. We find that the coefficient estimate on last month’s fund 
size is negative and statistically significant (t-statistic = 2.72) while that on the square of last 
month’s fund size is positive and statistically significant (t-statistic = 3.24). After controlling for 
the other variables, an increase in fund AUM from a small base of say US$10m to US$500m is 
associated with a reduction in annual abnormal returns of approximately 1.5 percent. As a 
manifestation of the convexity, a subsequent increase in fund AUM from US$500m to US$1bn 
is associated with additional reduction in risk-adjusted returns of only 0.5 percent. 
 Next, we evaluate the economic relevance of the capacity constraints by employing the 
portfolio sort methodology used by Carhart (1997) and others. We show that the portfolio of 
small (below median AUM) funds outperforms the portfolio of large (above median AUM) 
funds by about 2.75 percent per year (t-statistic = 6.15) after adjusting for covariation with the 
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven risk factors. The portfolios are formed every January 1st based on 
fund AUM last December. These results cannot be explained by self-selection induced backfill 
and incubation database biases (Fung and Hsieh, 2004), illiquidity induced serial correlation in 
returns, and differences in fund fees. The portfolio spread is still consistently above two percent 
per year and statistically significant (at the one percent level) regardless of whether we perform 
the sort analysis after removing the first 12 months of return data for each fund, after 
                                                 
1 We show that Getmansky’s results are sensitive to the model of self selection and termination that she uses.  
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unsmoothing the returns using the Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) approach, or after 
adding back fees to the post-fee returns. 
 Can hedge fund investors benefit by choosing small funds instead of large funds? Since 
investors cannot short sell hedge funds (at least those funds that are not publicly listed), spread 
portfolios of hedge funds may not be particularly relevant to them. Hence, we consider the 
performance of a hypothetical Fund of Funds portfolio with the typical fee structure of one 
percent management fee and ten percent performance fee, and that only invests in small hedge 
funds. We show that this hypothetical Fund of Funds delivers an after-fee alpha of 3.74 percent 
per year (t-statistic = 3.71), which is both economically and statistically significant. In contrast, 
the hypothetical Fund of Funds portfolio comprising only large hedge funds earns an after-fee 
alpha of 1.30 percent per year that is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Our results are 
robust to requiring that the Funds of Funds invest only in hedge funds that manage at least 
US$20 million. 
 What drives capacity constraints for hedge funds and how pervasive are they? We break 
down our fund universe into four broad investment styles (Security selection, Directional 
Traders, Relative Value, and Multi-process) and four investment regions (North America, 
Europe, Global, and Emerging Markets). We find that the portfolio sort results are robust across 
investment styles and regions. However, the spread alphas demonstrate substantial variation. For 
example, the spread alphas are relatively weak for Relative Value (1.29 percent) and Global 
(2.06 percent) funds who typically trade liquid and large-capitalization securities. Conversely, 
they are relatively strong for Emerging Market (6.75 percent) funds who typically trade illiquid 
and small-capitalization securities. These results suggest that price impact may lie at the root of 
the observed capacity constraints. Large hedge funds are likely to generate greater price impact 
with their trades than do small hedge funds as they attempt to deploy large amounts of capital in 
the markets. Moreover, the effects of price impact are especially severe for small capitalization 
and illiquid securities. Consistent with this view, we find that the capacity constraints are 
strongest for funds that by virtue of their tight share restrictions (long redemption and 
notification periods) are likely to hold more illiquid securities (Aragon, 2007).  
 We also show that the capacity constraints are related to the organization diseconomies 
proposed by Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Stein (2002). They argue that the process of agents 
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jostling to get ideas implemented in large organizations can create diseconomies of scale.2 
According to Stein (2002), such diseconomies or hierarchy costs are particularly relevant when 
tasks involve the processing of soft information, e.g., information that cannot be verified by 
anyone but the agent. Chen et al. (2004) and Berger et al. (2005) find evidence of hierarchy costs 
in mutual funds and banks, respectively. Since the investment management process at hedge 
funds very often involves soft information, i.e., subjective opinions as to whether a security is 
over or under-valued, hierarchy costs should impact hedge fund performance as well.  We show 
that consistent with this line of reasoning, the number of principals compounds the effects of size 
on hedge fund performance. Specifically, the alpha spread between small and large funds is 
almost twice as large for multi-principal funds as it is for single-principal funds.  
 Are hedge fund managers cognizant ex-ante of the diseconomies of scale that they will 
face? Evidence suggests that they are. We find that funds who are most affected by capacity 
constraints set higher performance fees and lower management fees than do funds who are least 
affected by capacity constraints. Funds who will potentially struggle with significant capacity 
issues benefit from high performance fees as such incentive fees allow fund managers to extract 
rents while curtailing asset growth and side-stepping diseconomies of scale. Conversely, funds 
who by the nature of the investment strategies eschew capacity issues are able to grow their 
assets without hurting future performance and can benefit from setting high management fees. 
Since hedge fund management contracts are determined upon inception, it is likely that managers 
understand prior to setting up the fund, perhaps through past financial market experience, the 
severity of capacity issues that they will face.     
 Thus far our analysis has focused on individual hedge funds. When we run the same 
portfolio analysis for Funds of Funds we find that the spread is -0.67 percent per year. That is 
large Funds of Funds outperform small Funds of Funds. While this effect is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero, it highlights the difference between hedge funds and Funds of 
Funds. Large Funds of Funds may be able to leverage on their size and negotiate better terms 
with their underlying hedge funds or invest in successful hedge funds that are otherwise closed to 
new investors. Moreover, since they do not directly manage portfolios of securities, they should 
be less affected by the adverse price impact from trading a large portfolio.  
                                                 
2 This line of research follows from theoretical work by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and 
Hart (1995) who argue that agents who lack control over allocation decisions face weaker incentives.  
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 The results suggest that hedge fund managers grapple with significant diseconomies of 
scale. In doing so, we build on several recent themes. In particular, our results complement 
earlier work on hedge fund performance persistence. Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999), 
Liang (2000), and Agarwal and Naik (2000) find that hedge fund performance does not persist at 
annual horizons. Berk and Green (2004) argue that even if fund managers possess investment 
skills, their performance will not persist if fund flows chase returns and capacity constraints are 
binding. Our work on capacity constraints helps us understand why hedge fund performance 
persistence, at least based on standard performance measures, remains elusive. Successful hedge 
funds attract inflows and experience significant asset growth. In the presence of the capacity 
constraints documented in this paper, this asset growth crimps future performance. More 
recently, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007) propose alternative Bayesian performance measures 
for hedge funds and find substantial evidence of performance persistence especially with Funds 
of Funds.3 Our results on Funds of Funds dovetail nicely with their findings. Since we find that 
size constraints are more relevant to individual hedge funds than to Funds of Funds, it is less 
likely that stellar Fund of Funds performance will be eroded away by asset growth.  
 We also extend work by Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) on hedge fund 
management contracts. They conjecture that the use of incentive fees is due to decreasing returns 
to scale in the industry. We tighten the link between capacity constraints and incentive fees. Our 
results suggest that fund managers who face significant capacity constraints set higher 
performance fees and lower management fees as they cannot grow assets without hurting future 
returns. Our analysis corroborates the Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) view that the 
compensation structure in the fund management industry provides a key signal of how future 
returns depend on the amount of money chasing after limited opportunities.  
 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
presents the main empirical results. A series of robustness tests follow in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Data 
 
 We evaluate the size and performance relationship of hedge funds using monthly net-of-
                                                 
3 See the decile spread alphas in their Table 7. 
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fee4 returns and assets under management (henceforth AUM) data of live and dead hedge funds 
reported in the TASS and HFR datasets between January 1994 to June 2008 – a time period that 
covers both market upturns and downturns, as well as relatively calm and turbulent periods. 
Since TASS and HFR started distributing their data in 1994, the datasets do not contain 
information on funds that died before December 1993. This gives rise to survivorship bias. We 
mitigate this bias by focusing on January 1994 onward data. 
 In our fund universe, we have a total of 4,556 live hedge funds and 5,442 dead hedge 
funds. However, due to concerns that funds with multiple share classes may cloud the analysis, 
we exclude duplicate share classes from the analysis.5 This leaves us with a total of 3,177 live 
hedge funds and 4,240 dead hedge funds. The breakdown of funds by database is illustrated in 
Figure 1. The Venn diagram in Figure 1 reveals that the funds are roughly evenly split between 
TASS and HFR. While there is some overlap between the two databases, there are many funds 
that belong to only one database. For example, there are 2,376 funds and 2,920 funds peculiar to 
the TASS and HFR databases, respectively. This highlights the advantage of obtaining our funds 
from more than one data source. 
[Please insert Figure 1 here] 
 Other than monthly return and size information, our sample also captures data on fund 
characteristics such as management fee, performance fee, redemption frequency, notification 
period, lock-up period, investment style, investment geographical region, fund leverage 
indicator, fund family, and fund minimum investment. These fund characteristics are recorded in 
year 2008 and, for our purposes we take these characteristics as constant over the sample period. 
Since minimum investments are sometimes quoted in currencies other than U.S. dollar, we 
convert all minimum investments to U.S. dollars using exchange rates on June 30, 2008 so as to 
facilitate meaningful comparison. 
 Following Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2008), we classify funds into four broad 
investment styles: Security Selection, Multi-process, Directional Trader, and Relative Value. 
Security Selection funds take long and short positions in undervalued and overvalued securities, 
respectively, and reduce systematic risks in the process. Usually, they take positions in equity 
markets. Multi-process funds employ multiple strategies that take advantage of opportunities 
                                                 
4 Our results are robust to using pre-fee returns. 
5 Inferences do not change when we include multiple share classes of the same fund in the analysis 
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created by significant transactional events, such as spin-offs, mergers and acquisitions, 
bankruptcy reorganizations, recapitalizations, and share buybacks. Directional Trader funds bet 
on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, equities, and bonds in the futures 
and cash market. Relative Value funds take positions on spread relations between prices of 
financial assets and aim to minimize market exposure. Table 1 breaks down the funds in our 
sample by investment strategy and reports the size distribution as well as the number of live and 
dead funds in each strategy.  
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
 We recognize that hedge fund data are susceptible to many biases (Fung and Hsieh, 
2000). These biases stem from the fact that, due to the lack of regulation amongst hedge funds, 
inclusion in hedge fund databases is voluntary. As a result, there is a self-selection bias. For 
instance, funds often undergo an incubation period where they rely on internal funding before 
seeking capital from outside investors. Incubated funds with successful track records then go on 
to list in various hedge fund databases while the unsuccessful funds do not, resulting in an 
incubation bias.  Separate from this, when a fund is listed on a database, it often includes data 
prior to the listing date. Again, since successful funds have a strong incentive to list and attract 
capital inflows, these backfilled returns tend to be higher than the non-backfilled returns. In the 
analysis that follows, we will repeat the tests after dropping the first 12 months of return data 
from each fund so as to ensure that the results are robust to backfill and incubation bias.   
 
3. Empirical results 
 
A. Size and the cross-section of fund alpha 
 
 To investigate the cross-sectional relationship between fund size and fund performance, 
we estimate Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions on monthly hedge fund alpha with lagged fund 
size as an independent variable. Specifically, we first run cross-sectional regressions for each 
month. Then, we report the time series averages of the coefficient estimates, and use the time-
series standard errors of the average slopes to draw inferences.  The Fama-MacBeth 
methodology is a convenient and conservative way of accounting for potential cross-correlation 
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in residuals. According to Fama and French (2002), Fama-MacBeth standard errors are often two 
to five times the OLS standard errors from pooled panel regressions that ignore cross-correlation. 
 Throughout this paper, we model the risks of hedge funds using the Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) seven-factor model. The set of factors comprises: the excess return on the S&P 500 index 
(SNPMRF); a small minus big factor (SCMLC) constructed as the difference between the 
Wilshire small and large capitalization stock indices; the yield spread of the U.S. 10-year 
Treasury bond over the three month Treasury bill, adjusted for duration of the 10-year bond 
(BD10RET); the change in the credit spread of Moody’s BAA bond over the 10-year Treasury 
bond, also appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), and the excess returns on portfolios 
of lookback straddle options on currencies (PTFSFX), commodities (PTFSCOM), and bonds 
(PTFSBD), which are constructed to replicate the maximum possible return on trend following 
strategies on their respective underlying assets. These seven factors have been shown by Fung 
and Hsieh (2004) to have considerable explanatory power on hedge fund returns. Agarwal and 
Naik (2004) present a factor model for hedge funds that includes some of the factors of the Fung 
and Hsieh (2004) model.  
 Following Carhart (1997), we first calculate monthly fund abnormal return or alpha as 
fund excess returns minus the factor realizations times loadings estimated over the entire sample 
period. Hence, we have  
 
)
10(
miMmiMmiM
miMmiMmiMmiMimim
PTFSCOMhPTFSFXgPTFSBDf
BAAMTSYeRETBDdSCMLCcSNPMRFbrALPHA
+++
+++−≡
  (1) 
 
where i = 1, …, nfunds, m = 1,…,M, imALPHA  is the abnormal return of fund i for month m, imr  
is fund return in excess of the risk free rate. To facilitate the estimation of fund alpha, we only 
include results for funds with at least 24 months of return data.6 
 Next we estimate the following Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions: 
 
imimimimim dFAMSIZEcFUNDSIZEbFUNDSIZEaALPHA ε++++= −−− 12 11   (2) 
 
                                                 
6 Similar results obtain for funds with at least 36 months of return data. Results are available upon request. 
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where FUNDSIZE is fund size or fund AUM, FAMSIZE is fund family size, PERFFEE is fund 
performance fee, MGTFEE is fund management fee, REDEMP is fund redemption period, 
MININV is minimum investment amount, FUNDAGE is fund age, STYLEDUM is investment 
style dummy, and GEODUM is investment region dummy.  
 We include the squared of FUNDSIZE to capture potential non-linearity in the fund size 
and performance relationship. The annual fund characteristic variables (i.e., fees, redemption 
period, minimum investments, fund age, investment style, and investment region) are included in 
the Eq. 3 regression as control variables to account for their potential impact on fund 
performance. For example, Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2008) show that funds with more high 
powered incentives deliver higher returns than do other funds. Aragon (2007) argues that funds 
with longer redemption periods may take on greater liquidity risk and achieve higher expected 
returns. Finally, managers of younger funds may outperform managers of older funds, regardless 
of the amount of assets they manage, simply because they are more driven. It is important to 
control for the effects of fund age when analyzing the capacity constraints facing the industry 
since younger funds typically also manage fewer assets.  
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
 The coefficient estimates on the fund size variables reported in Table 2 reveal a strong 
negative and convex relationship between last month’s fund AUM and this month’s fund 
abnormal return. They indicate that after controlling for the other variables, an increase in AUM 
from a small base of say US$10m to US$500m is associated with a reduction in annual abnormal 
returns of approximately )16.0*5.033.0*5.0(*12 2− or 1.5 percent. For comparison, an increase 
in AUM from US$10m to US$1bn is associated with a decrease in alpha of approximately 2 
percent per year and not 3 percent as a linear relationship would suggest. This highlights the 
convexity of the relationship between fund size and performance. We note that both the 
coefficient estimates on the fund size variables are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Interestingly, the coefficient estimate on the fund family variable is also statistically significant 
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for the regression without controls but is statistically indistinguishable from zero once we control 
for the other fund characteristics.  
 To illustrate the fund size and performance relationship, we sort fund monthly return and 
past AUM observations by AUM into 100 bins. Next, we plot the average monthly returns of the 
funds in each bin with their average past month’s AUM. The resultant scatter plot of Figure 2 
nicely summarizes the findings of Table 2. The downward sloping polynomial line of best fit 
drawn through the scatter plot is steeper in the region of small funds and gentler in the region of 
large funds, highlighting the convexity of the size and risk-adjusted performance relationship. 
This sharply contrasts with the concave relationship documented by Getmansky (2005) for size 
and raw fund performance.  
[Please insert Figure 2 here] 
 There are concerns that the results may be due to differences in the way backfill and 
incubation bias affects small versus large. If small funds backfill or incubate their returns while 
large funds do not, it may explain the overperformance of the former group of funds. Also, there 
are concerns that small funds may trade illiquid securities. As a result, for these funds, reported 
returns tend to be smoother than true economic returns, which understates volatility and 
overstates the statistical significance of risk-adjusted measures like alpha. To cater for such 
concerns, we re-estimate the regressions with backfill and incubation bias-adjusted alpha and 
with alpha derived from unsmoothed returns using the Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) 
correction.7 To adjust for backfill and incubation bias, we remove the first 12 months of return 
data from each fund and redo the alpha estimation for funds with at least 24 months of remaining 
return data. Lastly, to ensure that the underperformance of large funds is not simply due to their 
higher fees, we also re-do the analysis on pre-fee8 alpha. The results from this robustness 
analysis are presented in columns three to eight of Table 2, and suggest that the overperformance 
of small hedge funds is not driven by backfill bias, incubation bias, illiquidity, or lower fund 
fees. The coefficient estimates on the FUNDSIZE variable are statistically significant and 
economically relevant for all specifications and for the regressions with and without controls. 
 
                                                 
7 We use the average values of ,, 10 θθ and 2θ  for the various investment styles reported in their Table 8 to effect 
the correction. 
8 Pre-fee alphas are computed from pre-fee returns. We derive pre-fee returns by taking the high watermark and 
hurdle rate as the T-bill, and assuming that the returns accrue to a first-year investor in the fund.  
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B. The performance of portfolios sorted on fund size 
 
 To gauge the economic relevance of the capacity constraints facing hedge funds, we 
construct portfolios of funds based on fund size and compare their risk-adjusted performance. 
Specifically, every January 1st, we form an equal-weighted portfolio of small funds (portfolio A) 
and an equal-weighted portfolio of large funds (portfolio B) based on AUM in December. We 
define small funds as funds with AUM equal to or less than that of the median fund. Conversely, 
we define large funds as funds with AUM greater than that of the median fund. Next, we 
evaluate the performance of the portfolios relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model over the 
next 12 months. The alpha of the spread between portfolio A and portfolio B represents the value 
added to investors of investing in small hedge funds and avoiding large hedge funds.  
 The results from this exercise are displayed in Panel A of Table 3 and show that the 
strategy of investing in small hedge funds and avoiding large funds yields a risk-adjusted return 
of 2.75 percent per year (t-statistic = 6.15). This suggests that managing many assets is 
detrimental to future performance. Can hedge fund investors benefit by choosing small funds 
instead of large funds? Since one cannot short sell hedge funds, we evaluate the performance of 
the small fund portfolio (portfolio A) after discounting the one percent management fee and ten 
percent performance fee charged by the typical Fund of Funds. We find that after fees, the 
hypothetical Funds of Funds portfolio comprising small hedge funds delivers an after-fee alpha 
of 3.74 percent per year, which is both economically and statistically significant (t-statistic = 
3.71). In contrast, the hypothetical Fund of Funds portfolio comprising large hedge funds only 
earns an after-fee alpha of 1.30 percent per year that is statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
 Consistent with the cross-sectional regression results, our findings are robust to 
adjustments for backfill and incubation bias, serial correlation in returns, and fund fees. All the 
spread alphas in Panels B, C, and D of Table 3 are comfortably above 2 percent per year and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. It is reassuring to note that the portfolios returns 
(Portfolios A and B) are well explained by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factor model. The adjusted 
R-squares for portfolios A and B are consistently greater than 65 percent. 
 Figure 3 illustrates the results from the baseline portfolio sorts. It shows the monthly 
cumulative average residuals (henceforth CARs) from the portfolio of small funds (portfolio A) 
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and the portfolio of large funds (portfolio B). CAR is the cumulative difference between a 
portfolio's excess return and its factor loadings (estimated over the entire sample period) 
multiplied by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) risk factors. The CARs in Figure 3 indicate that 
portfolio A consistently outperforms portfolio B over the entire sample period and suggest that 
the deleterious effects of fund size are not confined to a particular time period. 
 [Please insert Figure 3 here]  
 One concern is that small hedge funds may use greater leverage and hence mechanically 
outperform large hedge funds. This may well be the case if these small funds trade more 
aggressively in a bid to deliver greater returns and attract larger inflows. As a check, we compute 
the information ratio (alpha divided by tracking error) of the portfolios in Panel A of Table 3. We 
find that the annualized information ratios for portfolio A, portfolio B, and the spread are 1.72, 
1.10, and 1.55, respectively. Since the information ratio adjusts for the additional volatility that 
leverage induces, the higher information ratio of the small fund portfolio indicates that its 
overperformance is not simply a by-product of leverage.  
 Are the documented size constraints pervasive across the investment strategies or unique 
to a specific strategy? To check whether the documented capacity constraints apply broadly to 
hedge funds, we break down the sort analysis by investment strategy. That is, we redo the sorts 
for each of our four broadly defined investment styles: security selection, directional traders, 
relative value, and multi-process. The spread alphas reported in Panels A – D of Table 4 are all 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level and indicate that the capacity issues are robust 
across investment strategies. However, variations across styles do exist. The performance 
differential between small and large funds is greatest for security selection (3.96 percent per 
year) and weakest for relative value (1.29 percent per year). One view is that relative value funds 
trade mostly liquid fixed income securities and hence are less affected by price impact issues.    
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
 Thus far the analysis has focused on single-manager hedge funds. However it may be 
instructive to separately analyze the size effect for Funds of Funds. This is because Funds of 
Funds invest in multiple hedge funds and do not manage a portfolio of securities. Hence they 
should be relatively immune to the price impact induced size constraints that plaque hedge funds. 
The results in Panel E of Table 4 are consistent with this line of reasoning. Small Funds of Funds 
do not outperform large Funds of Funds. In fact, large Funds of Funds deliver risk-adjusted 
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returns that are slightly higher (though the difference is statistically indistinguishable from zero) 
than small Funds of Funds. Perhaps, large Funds of Funds are able to capitalize on their greater 
purchasing power and gain access to successful single-manager hedge funds that are otherwise 
closed to new investments. In any case, following the logic of Berk and Green (2004), the lack of 
capacity constraints for Funds of Funds suggest that performance persistence should be strongest 
for Funds of Funds; since without such capacity constraints, inflows on the back of good 
performance no longer crimp future performance. The results in Panel E of Table 4 thus dovetail 
nicely with the strong evidence of performance persistence documented for Funds of Funds by 
Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007). They show in their Table 7 that the decile spread between fund 
portfolios sorted on past performance is most statistically significant for Funds of Funds. 
 
C.  Capacity constraints and price impact 
 
 Do the capacity constraints facing large hedge funds stem from the price impact of their 
trades? If so, then it must be the case that these capacity constraints are accentuated for funds 
that trade small illiquid securities. This is because it is much harder to move funds in and out of 
small capitalization illiquid securities without having price move against the trader.  Conversely, 
it is significantly easier to shift funds in and out of large capitalization liquid securities without 
changing prices. As a corollary to this, Carhart et al. (2002) show that small cap mutual funds 
can more effectively “lean for the tape” or ratchet up the price of their stock holdings with end-
of-the-quarter purchases than can large cap mutual funds.  
 To test the hypothesis that the capacity constraints are driven by price impact effects, we 
redo the portfolio sort analysis on hedge funds stratified by the size and illiquidity of their 
underlying holdings. How does one distinguish between funds that trade small capitalization 
thinly-traded securities from funds that trade large capitalization frequently-traded securities 
without knowing their underlying holdings? One way is to look at the geographical region that 
they invest in. For example, Emerging Market stocks tend to be smaller and more illiquid than 
Developed Market stocks. In this effort, we redo the analysis for funds investing in the North 
American, European, Global, and Emerging Market regions. The results reported in Table 5 
corroborate the price impact hypothesis. The alpha of the spread between the small Emerging 
Market fund and large Emerging Market fund portfolios is 6.75 percent per year (t-statistic = 
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2.47) and dwarfs the spread alphas for funds investing in the North American, European, and 
Global regions. Also given that global securities (e.g., components of the MSCI world indices) 
are the best capitalized and most frequently traded securities in the financial markets, and it is 
not surprising that the capacity constraints are weakest for funds trading in the Global region. 
The small Global fund portfolio only outperforms the large Global fund portfolio by 2.06 percent 
per year after adjusting for risk.  
[Please insert Tables 5 and 6 here] 
 To shed further light on the drivers behind the capacity constraints, we stratify hedge 
funds based on the liquidity of their underlying holdings, by using fund share restrictions as a 
proxy, and redo the portfolio analysis. It has been argued by Aragon (2007) and others that funds 
with long redemption periods tend to hold more illiquid securities than do funds with short 
redemption periods. Such share restrictions allow funds sufficient time with which to exit from 
their illiquid positions. The results in Table 6 are broadly supportive of the price impact story. 
They indicate that regardless of whether we use redemption frequency or redemption notification 
period to categorize funds, funds trading illiquid securities tend to experience greater capacity 
constraints than funds trading liquid securities. For example, the spread alpha for hedge funds 
that allow for frequent redemptions (every month at worst) is 2.48 percent per year while that for 
hedge funds that allow for less frequent redemptions (every quarter at best) is 3.02 percent per 
year. Taken together, the results from Tables 5 and 6 suggest that price impact factors may lie at 
the root of the capacity constraints facing hedge funds.  
 
D.  Capacity constraints and hierarchy costs 
 
 Are organizational diseconomies also responsible for some of the capacity constraints 
that we observe for hedge funds? Chen et al. (2004) find that controlling for fund size, team 
managed mutual funds underperform single-manager mutual funds. They attribute this effect to 
the hierarchy costs proposed by Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Stein (2002). According to Stein 
(2002) the process of agents jostling to get their ideas implemented in large organizations can 
create diseconomies of scale especially when those ideas involve soft information, i.e., 
information that cannot be verified by anyone other than the agent herself. As a result of this 
competition for resources amongst agents, the best ideas do not always get implemented as 
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agents choose ex-ante to focus on ideas supported by hard information, which can be easily 
verified. Such organizational diseconomies follow in the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1986), 
Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995) who argue that agents face weak incentives when they 
do not exercise control over the allocation of resources.  
 Since investment decisions at hedge funds often involve soft information, e.g., subjective 
opinions on whether a security is over or under-valued, we hypothesize that hierarchy costs can 
induce organization diseconomies in hedge funds as well. To test this, we redo the portfolio sorts 
for single principal hedge funds and for multi-principal hedge funds. Since only HFR includes 
principal information, we run this analysis for HFR funds only. Despite the reduced sample size, 
the findings reported in Table 7 are striking. For hedge funds managed by a single principal, the 
alpha spread between small and large hedge funds is 2.64 percent per year. For hedge funds 
managed by two principals, the alpha spread rises to 5.25 percent per year. When we analyze 
hedge funds managed by more than two principals, the alpha spread rises yet again to 6.65 
percent per year. This monotonic relationship between the number of principals and the strength 
of the capacity constraints suggests that hierarchy costs exacerbate the diseconomies faced by 
large hedge funds.   
[Please insert Table 7 here] 
 
E. Capacity constraints and fund incentives 
 
 Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) argue that the existence of performance fees can 
be explained by the diseconomies of scale facing hedge funds. Because of capacity constraints, 
successful funds will want to curtail inflows if they wish to maintain their returns. With 
performance fees, investors can compensate managers based on their returns and not solely on 
the assets that their returns attract.  
 If hedge fund managers understand the severity of the capacity constraints that they face 
then they should structure their compensation contracts to accommodate those constraints. 
According to the Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) line of reasoning, hedge funds who run 
into substantial capacity constraints will find it advantageous to receive more of their 
compensation in the form of performance fees. Conversely, hedge funds who are less affected by 
capacity constraints will find it in their best interests to receive more of their compensation in the 
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form of management fees. Hence, on one hand, we should expect to find weak capacity 
constraints for asset gatherers or hedge funds with high management fees and low performance 
fees. One the other hand, we should expect to find strong capacity constraints for non-asset 
gatherers or hedge funds with low management fees and high performance fees.      
[Please insert Table 8 here] 
 We test this hypothesis by stratifying funds based on their management and performance 
fees, and leveraging on the portfolio sort framework of Table 3. The results in Table 8 are 
broadly consistent with Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) and the idea that hedge fund 
managers are cognizant of the capacity constraints that will they face prior to setting up the fund. 
The alpha spreads in Panels A and D of Table 8 indicate that fund managers who set high 
management fees or low performance fees typically do not experience significant diseconomies 
of scale. In contrast, the alpha spreads in Panels B and C of Table 8 suggest that fund managers 
who set low management fees or high performance fees typically have to contend with 
significant diseconomies of scale. For example, within the low performance fee group of funds 
(performance fee < 20 percent), small funds outperform large funds by a modest 0.58 percent per 
year after adjusting for risk. Yet, within the high performance fee group of funds (performance 
fee ≥ 20 percent), small funds outperform large funds by 3.40 percent per year after adjusting for 
risk.  
 
4. Robustness tests 
 
 In this section, we present robustness tests to evaluate the strength of our empirical 
results. One recurring concern is that the size effects may be caused by fund leverage. Small 
funds in their pursuit of high returns may take on more leverage. In our sort analysis, this will 
mechanically drive up the average risk-adjusted return of the small fund portfolio relative to that 
of the large fund portfolio. Still, as discussed in Section 3A, a comparison of the information 
ratios of the portfolios suggest that it is unlikely that leverage lies at the root of their performance 
differential. Nonetheless, to dispel any residual leverage related concerns, we perform the sort 
analysis for funds with and without leverage. We can do so as HFR and TASS include an 
indicator variable for leverage. The results reported in Panels A and B of Table 9 reaffirm our 
earlier conclusions that leverage does not drive the performance advantage of small funds. Small 
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funds who eschew leverage outperform large funds who eschew leverage by 2.47 percent per 
year after adjusting for risk. While the performance differential is somewhat higher for funds 
who do employ leverage, the fact that the results still hold for funds who avoid leverage 
altogether make clear that leverage does not drive the bulk of the performance differential 
between small and large funds. 
[Please insert Table 9 here] 
 Yet another concern is that the results thus far are not particularly relevant to large 
institutional investors as the performance differential may be driven entirely by the smallest of 
funds. Given the convex relationship documented in Figure 2, the effects of size may not be 
meaningful for the kind of funds that institutional investors focus on. Specifically, large 
institutional investors may find it difficult to invest in small funds who manage less than a 
certain size cutoff, e.g., US$20 million. Hence in Panels C and D of Table 9, we report portfolio 
sort results for funds that manage less than US$20 million and for funds that mange more than 
US$20 million. The results in Panel D of Table 9 indicate that within the group of funds who 
manage more than US$20 million, small funds continue to outperform large funds after adjusting 
for risk. Even with the size cutoff, the small fund portfolio trumps the large fund portfolio by a 
risk-adjusted 2.14 percent per year (t-statistic = 4.54). In addition, assuming that the small fund 
portfolio is part of a Fund of Funds charging the typical 1 percent management fee and 10 
percent performance fee, it will generate a statistically significant alpha of 2.79 percent per year 
after fees. This suggests that while the capacity constraints are less striking in the region of large 
funds, they are still economically meaningful for hedge fund investors.     
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 Inundated almost daily by news of large and successful hedge funds, readers of the 
financial press may well believe that large hedge funds are also successful going forward. The 
results in this paper challenge that view. We show that large hedge funds grapple with significant 
diseconomies of scale, and consequently under perform small hedge funds, ex-post. The 
portfolio of small hedge funds outperforms the portfolio of large hedge funds by 2.75 percent per 
year after adjusting for risk. The capacity constraints are pervasive across the industry and 
cannot be explained by hedge fund database biases, leverage, fund age, and illiquidity-induced 
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serial correlation. While the size and performance relationship is convex and strongest in the 
region of small funds, it is not confined to the smallest of funds. We show that such size effects 
are most apparent for funds trading small illiquid securities, i.e., Emerging Market funds and 
funds with high share restrictions, suggesting that price impact may lie at the root of the capacity 
constraints. In addition, we show that some of the capacity constraints can be traced to the 
hierarchy costs proposed by Stein (2002). As a result of hierarchy costs, the underperformance of 
large hedge funds is especially severe for hedge funds managed by multiple principals. These 
principals compete with one another to implement their investment ideas. Since information 
supporting the best investment ideas may not be verifiable, competition amongst principals 
creates organizational diseconomies as the best investment ideas are not always implemented.  
 Our results also have implications for the nascent literature on hedge funds. Together 
with the reasoning of Berk and Green (2004), they provide support for why Agarwal and Naik 
(2000) and Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999) find scant evidence of performance 
persistence at annual horizons. They also corroborate evidence by Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and 
Ross (2003) who argue that fund capacity constraints may explain the use of incentive fees in the 
hedge fund industry. Indeed we sharpen their results and show that funds who experience greater 
capacity constraints adopt higher performance fees (and lower management fees) than do funds 
who are able to avoid such constraints. Our results also suggest that hedge fund managers are 
aware of the capacity constraints that they will face prior to setting up their compensation 
structure. Finally, the size effects documented in this paper help us understand why some 
successful hedge funds close their funds to new investments. 
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Figure 1: Break down of funds by database vendor. Fund numbers in brackets include duplicate share classes of the same fund. The sample period is from January
1994 to June 2008.
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Figure 2: Cumulative abnormal return of small versus large hedge funds. Equal-weighted portfolios of hedge funds are constructed by sorting funds every January
1st based on fund size. Cumulative abnormal return is the difference between a portfolio's excess return and its factor loadings multiplied by the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) risk factors.  Factor loadings are estimated over the entire sample period. The sample period is from January 1994 to June 2008.
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Figure 3: The relationship between hedge fund monthly abnormal returns and past assets. Monthly hedge fund abnormal return observations are sorted into 100 bins
based on the funds' past month's assets. For each bin, we calculate the average monthly abnormal return and assets. These average monthly abnormal returns and
assets data are plotted and a quadratic polynomial is fitted through them. Monthly abnormal return is the difference between a fund's excess return and its factor
loadings multiplied by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) risk factors. Factor loadings are estimated over the entire sample period. The sample period is from January 1994
to June 2008. 
2m 5m 10m 50m 100m 500m 1bn 5bn 10bn
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
assets in USD (log scale)
m
o
n
t
h
l
y
 
r
i
s
k
-
a
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
(
%
)
risk-adjusted returns
   quadratic polynomial
Investment strategy Total funds Dead funds AUM<$20m $20m≤AUM<$100m $100m≤AUM<$500m AUM>$500m Return months
Security Selection 2715 1234 1199 992 410 114 140710
Multi-process 999 483 349 355 221 74 45927
Directional Trader 1752 1184 885 600 194 73 83298
Relative Value 1308 787 474 503 272 59 62042
Others 643 552 446 155 34 8 26953
Total 7417 4240 3353 2605 1131 328 358930
Table 1
Summary statistics
The sample period is from January 1994 to June 2008. Funds are grouped according to their primary investment strategy. Security Selection funds take long and short
positions in undervalued and overvalued securities, respectively, and reduce systematic risks in the process. Usually, they take positions in equity markets. Multi-
process funds employ multiple strategies that take advantage of opportunities created by significant transactional events, such as spin-offs, mergers and acquisitions,
bankruptcy reorganizations, recapitalizations, and share buybacks. Directional Trader funds bet on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, equities,
and bonds in the futures and cash market. Relative Value funds take positions on spread relations between prices of financial assets and aim to minimize market
exposure. AUM is average assets under management (averaged over time). The total number of funds is 7,417. The total number of dead funds is 4,240. And the total
number of fund months with return information is 358,930
Average AUM in US$
Independent variables
without controls with controls without controls with controls without controls with controls without controls with controls
lagged fund size (US$bn) -0.29** -0.33** -0.28** -0.36** -0.29** -0.35** -0.27** -0.34**
(-3.25) (-2.72) (-2.75) (-2.85) (-3.05) (-2.75) (-3.03) (-2.77)
lagged fund size squared 0.11** 0.16** 0.10* 0.15** 0.11* 0.17** 0.11** 0.17**
(2.84) (3.24) (2.43) (2.98) (2.57) (3.15) (2.72) (3.37)
lagged family size -0.06* -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.09** -0.04
(-2.13) (-1.02) (-0.98) (-0.45) (-1.93) (-0.92) (-2.98) (-1.30)
bias-adjusted alpha alpha
monthly alpha backfill and incubation unsmoothed pre-fee alpha
Table 2
Fama MacBeth cross-sectional regressions on hedge fund alpha
Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions are estimated on the cross-section of hedge fund alpha. The dependent variable is hedge fund monthly alpha. The independent
variables are hedge fund characteristics such as lagged monthly fund size, lagged monthly fund size squared, and lagged monthly family size. In the regressions with
controls we also include as independent variables fund management fee, performance fee, redemption period, minumum investment, and fund age in months, as well as
style and geographical region dummies. The t-statistics derived from White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses. The coefficient estimates on the control variables
and dummies are omitted for brevity. The fund and family size variables are in US$bn. The sample period is from January 1994 to June 2008. * Significant at the 5%
level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable
Portfolio
Mean 
Ret. (pct/ 
year) Std. Dev.
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Adj. R2
Portfolio A (small funds) 11.97 6.63 5.96 5.85 0.32 0.27 0.08 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.69
Portfolio B (large funds) 9.08 5.85 3.21 3.55 0.28 0.24 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.70
Spread (A-B) 2.89 1.94 2.75 6.15 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.20
Portfolio A (small funds) 11.09 6.69 5.07 4.87 0.32 0.26 0.09 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.68
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.90 5.82 3.05 3.41 0.28 0.23 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.70
Spread (A-B) 2.19 2.15 2.03 4.10 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.20
Portfolio A (small funds) 11.94 7.33 5.60 5.22 0.38 0.31 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.73
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.99 6.57 2.80 2.86 0.33 0.28 0.09 0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.73
Spread (A-B) 2.95 2.04 2.79 5.94 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.20
Portfolio A (small funds) 16.87 6.77 10.83 10.38 0.33 0.27 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.69
Portfolio B (large funds) 13.07 5.94 7.17 7.80 0.29 0.24 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.70
Spread (A-B) 3.80 2.02 3.66 7.90 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.20
Panel B: Adjusted for backfill and incubation bias
Panel C: Adjusted for serial correlation
Panel D: Pre-fee returns
Table 3
Sorts on fund size
Hedge funds are sorted every January 1st based on fund size. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds with below median AUM. Portfolio B is the equal-
weighted portfolio of funds with above median AUM. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are
S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year
Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately
adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend
following strategy. The sample period is from January 1994 - June 2008.
Panel A: All funds
Portfolio
Mean 
Ret. (pct/ 
year) Std. Dev.
Alpha 
(pct/ 
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t -stat of 
alpha
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Adj. R2
Portfolio A (small funds) 15.20 9.32 8.17 6.53 0.50 0.43 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.77
Portfolio B (large funds) 11.11 8.56 4.21 3.75 0.46 0.39 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.80
Spread (A-B) 4.08 2.43 3.96 6.75 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.12
Portfolio A (small funds) 11.48 8.06 4.85 3.58 0.37 0.32 0.13 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.61
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.45 7.67 2.06 1.50 0.33 0.29 0.12 0.16 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.56
Spread (A-B) 3.03 2.52 2.79 4.43 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05
Portfolio A (small funds) 9.00 2.86 4.26 7.49 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.16 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.47
Portfolio B (large funds) 7.50 2.80 2.96 4.95 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.14 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.30
Spread (A-B) 1.50 1.78 1.29 2.89 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04
Portfolio A (small funds) 12.36 6.02 6.44 5.94 0.24 0.23 0.02 0.15 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.54
Portfolio B (large funds) 9.75 4.62 4.15 5.33 0.19 0.18 0.04 0.19 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.63
Spread (A-B) 2.61 3.67 2.29 2.47 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.03
Portfolio A (small funds) 7.10 5.64 1.51 1.42 0.20 0.21 0.06 0.21 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.51
Portfolio B (large funds) 7.81 5.42 2.18 2.18 0.21 0.19 0.09 0.12 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.52
Spread (A-B) -0.72 2.15 -0.67 -1.33 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.16
Panel E: Fund of Funds
Panel B: Directional Trader funds
Panel D: Multi-process funds
Table 4
Sorts on fund size stratified by fund investment strategy
Hedge funds are sorted every January 1st based on fund size. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds with below median AUM. Portfolio B is the equal-
weighted portfolio of funds with above median AUM. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are
S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year
Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately
adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend
following strategy. The sample period is from January 1994 - June 2008.
Panel A: Security Selection funds
Panel C: Relative Value funds
Portfolio
Mean 
Ret. (pct/ 
year) Std. Dev.
Alpha 
(pct/ 
year)
t -stat of 
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Adj. R2
Portfolio A (small funds) 14.06 6.69 7.74 9.16 0.35 0.31 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.80
Portfolio B (large funds) 10.30 5.43 4.48 6.66 0.28 0.27 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.85
Spread (A-B) 3.76 2.55 3.26 5.63 0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.22
Portfolio A (small funds) 12.81 7.02 7.22 4.55 0.19 0.12 0.05 0.23 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.22
Portfolio B (large funds) 10.10 8.90 3.67 1.97 0.32 0.19 0.09 0.11 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.33
Spread (A-B) 2.71 6.41 3.55 2.25 -0.12 -0.06 -0.03 0.12 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.08
Portfolio A (small funds) 10.39 6.92 5.77 4.10 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.40
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.79 5.67 3.71 3.24 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.41
Spread (A-B) 1.60 3.10 2.06 2.99 -0.02 0.02 0.08 -0.08 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.25
Portfolio A (small funds) 22.22 23.09 12.30 2.40 0.75 0.37 -0.12 0.63 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.26
Portfolio B (large funds) 15.55 19.37 5.55 1.33 0.55 0.40 -0.08 0.91 -0.06 0.00 0.03 0.30
Spread (A-B) 6.67 10.77 6.75 2.47 0.20 -0.02 -0.04 -0.28 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03
Panel B: Europe funds
Panel C: Global funds
Panel D: Emerging Market funds
Table 5
Sorts on fund size stratified by fund investment region
Hedge funds are sorted every January 1st based on fund size. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds with below median AUM. Portfolio B is the equal-
weighted portfolio of funds with above median AUM. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are
S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year
Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately
adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend
following strategy. The sample period is from January 1994 - June 2008.
Panel A: North America funds
Portfolio
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alpha
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Adj. R2
Portfolio A (small funds) 14.19 8.48 7.24 6.53 0.44 0.41 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.78
Portfolio B (large funds) 10.72 6.97 4.22 4.68 0.36 0.33 0.03 0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.79
Spread (A-B) 3.48 2.83 3.02 4.69 0.08 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.22
Portfolio A (small funds) 10.65 6.09 5.26 4.70 0.25 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.54
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.19 5.43 2.78 2.74 0.22 0.17 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.53
Spread (A-B) 2.46 1.96 2.48 5.43 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.18
Portfolio A (small funds) 14.33 7.67 7.74 7.11 0.37 0.36 0.00 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.74
Portfolio B (large funds) 11.00 6.76 4.65 4.70 0.32 0.30 0.01 0.13 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.72
Spread (A-B) 3.33 2.73 3.09 4.64 0.06 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.10
Portfolio A (small funds) 11.49 6.65 5.59 5.25 0.32 0.27 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.66
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.55 5.83 2.74 2.90 0.27 0.23 0.09 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.66
Spread (A-B) 2.94 2.32 2.85 5.33 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.19
Panel C: Long redemption notification period funds ( >one month)
Panel D: Short redemption notification period funds (<=one month)
Panel B: High redemption frequency funds (<=one month)
Table 6
Sorts on fund size stratified by fund share restrictions
Hedge funds are sorted every January 1st based on fund size. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds with below median AUM. Portfolio B is the equal-
weighted portfolio of funds with above median AUM. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are
S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year
Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately
adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend
following strategy. The sample period is from January 1994 - June 2008.
Panel A: Low redemption frequency funds (>one month)
Portfolio
Mean 
Ret. (pct/ 
year) Std. Dev.
Alpha 
(pct/ 
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t -stat of 
alpha
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Adj. R2
Portfolio A (small funds) 14.41 7.28 8.39 6.75 0.35 0.25 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.59
Portfolio B (large funds) 11.42 6.03 5.75 5.54 0.26 0.22 0.07 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.60
Spread (A-B) 2.99 3.20 2.64 3.44 0.09 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.14
Portfolio A (small funds) 15.75 7.41 9.36 7.73 0.35 0.28 0.01 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.64
Portfolio B (large funds) 10.90 7.52 4.11 3.50 0.35 0.30 0.04 0.24 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.66
Spread (A-B) 4.85 3.87 5.25 5.32 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Portfolio A (small funds) 15.51 7.22 9.54 7.88 0.33 0.28 0.12 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.60
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.63 5.15 2.89 3.41 0.23 0.19 0.11 0.16 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.65
Spread (A-B) 6.88 4.18 6.65 6.68 0.10 0.09 0.01 -0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.14
Panel B: Funds with two principals
Panel C: Funds with more than two principals
Table 7
Sorts on fund size stratified by number of principals
Hedge funds are sorted every January 1st based on fund size. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds with below median AUM. Portfolio B is the equal-
weighted portfolio of funds with above median AUM. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are
S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year
Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately
adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend
following strategy. The sample period is from January 1994 - June 2008.
Panel A: Funds with one principal
Portfolio
Mean 
Ret. (pct/ 
year) Std. Dev.
Alpha 
(pct/ 
year)
t -stat of 
alpha
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Adj. R2
Portfolio A (small funds) 11.03 10.03 7.30 3.50 0.12 0.20 0.30 -0.10 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.37
Portfolio B (large funds) 10.08 9.46 6.23 3.05 0.09 0.14 0.31 -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.31
Spread (A-B) 0.94 3.96 1.06 1.06 0.04 0.06 -0.01 -0.08 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03
Portfolio A (small funds) 12.15 6.72 5.93 6.10 0.34 0.29 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.73
Portfolio B (large funds) 9.00 6.04 2.93 3.26 0.30 0.25 0.05 0.12 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.72
Spread (A-B) 3.14 2.02 3.00 6.33 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.17
Portfolio A (small funds) 12.93 6.50 7.10 6.85 0.30 0.27 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.66
Portfolio B (large funds) 9.40 5.57 3.70 4.26 0.26 0.24 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.69
Spread (A-B) 3.52 2.04 3.40 7.29 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.21
Portfolio A (small funds) 9.28 7.69 2.68 2.30 0.40 0.28 0.07 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.69
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.70 7.34 2.10 1.78 0.36 0.24 0.07 0.18 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.67
Spread (A-B) 0.58 2.83 0.58 0.84 0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.10
Panel D: Low performance fee funds (performance fee < 20%)
Panel A: High management fee funds (management fee > 2%)
Panel C: High performance fee funds (performance fee >= 20%)
Table 8
Sorts on fund size stratified by fund fee
Hedge funds are sorted every January 1st based on fund size. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds with below median AUM. Portfolio B is the equal-
weighted portfolio of funds with above median AUM. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are
S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year
Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately
adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend
following strategy. The sample period is from January 1994 - June 2008.
Panel B: Low management fee funds (management fee <=2%)
Portfolio
Mean 
Ret. (pct/ 
year) Std. Dev.
Alpha 
(pct/ 
year)
t -stat of 
alpha
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Adj. R2
Portfolio A (small funds) 11.24 7.29 4.66 4.80 0.39 0.30 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.78
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.44 6.52 2.19 2.25 0.34 0.25 0.04 0.11 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70
Spread (A-B) 2.80 2.54 2.47 4.07 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.14
Portfolio A (small funds) 12.34 6.65 6.60 5.82 0.29 0.26 0.11 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.60
Portfolio B (large funds) 9.45 5.67 3.82 4.06 0.25 0.23 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.64
Spread (A-B) 2.89 2.12 2.78 5.61 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.17
Portfolio A (small funds) 12.98 7.25 6.94 5.91 0.33 0.30 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.65
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.75 6.29 2.66 2.85 0.33 0.23 0.06 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.73
Spread (A-B) 4.23 3.07 4.28 5.75 0.01 0.08 0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.11
Portfolio A (small funds) 10.78 6.15 4.87 5.14 0.29 0.28 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.70
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.47 5.67 2.73 2.99 0.27 0.21 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.66
Spread (A-B) 2.31 1.96 2.14 4.54 0.02 0.07 0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13
Panel B: Leveraged funds
Panel C: Funds with AUM <= US$20m
Panel D: Funds with AUM > US$20m
Table 9
Sorts on fund size, robustness tests
Hedge funds are sorted every January 1st based on fund size. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds with below median AUM. Portfolio B is the equal-
weighted portfolio of funds with above median AUM. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are
S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year
Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately
adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend
following strategy. The sample period is from January 1994 - June 2008.
Panel A: Unleveraged funds
